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November 10, 1988

Geoffrey Butler
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Re:

State v. Francis Preston Mitchell
Case No. 860237

Dear Geoff:
Pursuant to the provisions of 24(j) R. Utah S. Ct.,
appellant provides the Court with significant and pertinent
authorities as more fully set forth below.
In Walvrun v. State, 336 S.E.2d 798, 803-804 (Geo. Dec.
1985), the Supreme Court of Georgia aligned itself with those
jurisdictions holding hypnotically refreshed recall to be
inadmissible in the State of Georgia. This has specific relevance to page 30 of Appellant's Brief and page 9 of Reply Brief
of Appellant, and specifically contradicts the,State's position
and alignment of Georgia with other jurisdictions as referenced
at page 24 of Brief of Respondent.
In Alsbach v. Badar, 700 S.W.2d 823, 824-830 (Mo. banc
Dec. 1985), specifically adopted the Frye test for the admissibility of hypnotic recall and concluded that hypnosis was too
unreliable. This has specific significance to Brief of Appellant, page 30, as well as Appellant's Reply Brief, pages 20-25.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the other and
majority position indicating that hypnotic recall is inadmissible
in Harmer v. State, 700 P.2d 212 (Ok. 1985) which has general
significance to footnote 3 at page 30 of Appellant's Brief.
An original and nine copies of this/letter are provided
to you pursuant to the above cited

Ited,

ETH R. 'BROWN
KRB:gp

cc:

Eito

^

Stan Olsen
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintitf-Respondent, :
v*

:

FRANCIS PRESTON MITCHELL,

:

Detenaant-Appellant.

Case No. 860327

Priority No. 2

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDEAT
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the trial court properly admit Patricia

Tyrell's hypnotically refreshed testimony, where she merely
remembered details of the event and the assailant, her
prehypnosis statements consistently gave a generalized
description, and procedural sateguards were followed during
hypnosis to maximize the reliability of the testimony?
2.

Did the trial court propeny admit testimony ot a

telephone conversation between the defendant and his friend in
Miami in which detenaant confessed he had killed a man, wnere
such conversation was inadvertently intercepted by an operator
during tne rendition ot her employment in that capacity?
STJVTgHBNT QF TBB CASE
Defendant, Francis Preston Mitchell, was charged with
criminal homicide, a first degree felony, in violation ot Utah

Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1)(d) (Supp. 1984) (R. 3-5). 1
Defendant was convicted of criminal homicide in a jury
trial held January lb, 1^86 through January 20, 1986, in the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Summit County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Scott Daniels, Judge, presiding (R. 792)•
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Daniels on February 1, 1986, to
life in the Utah State Prison (R. 850, 8b4) . Detenaant filed a
Motion for New Trial (R. 884-1110), which was denied (R. 1562).
This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMENT OF FACTS PWf-ATTfg TO THE COMMISSION OF
THE MPUPgRt
At the time ot tne shooting incident, Greg Oliver,
defendant's friend, lived in Wasatch Condominiums in Park City,
Utah (Tr. Vol. 6 at 640). Greg's fatner, Brian Oliver, lived in
a home at 1172 Woodside Avenue in Park City, Utah (Tr. Vol. 2 at
lb^-6!>) .
On August 4, 15*84, the victim, Fred Duncan, and his
fiance, Patricia Tyrell, were house guests of Brian Oliver at the
Woodside Avenue home in Park City (Tyrell 3, 4-5). Duncan and
Tyrell had come to Park City for vacation (Tyrell 4-5)• They had
spent that day attending the Arts Festival in Park City and were
watching television in the Oliver living room from approximately
9:00 to 11:30 p.m. (Tyrell 6-7, 13-31).
1

Brian was sick and had

"R." reters to the record on appeal. "Tr." refers to tne
transcript of the trial by its given volume number. "Tyrell"
rerers to the separate volume ot Patricia Tyrellfs trial
testimony. "Ptl. Tr." refers to the volume labeled Partial
Transcript.

gone to bea early in his own bedroom at the front ot the house
(Tyrell 7 ) .
At about the same time, the defendant was attending a
concert at the Salt Palace in Salt Lake City with his sister (Kim
Mitchell), Tom Greco, and some frienos (Tr. Vol. 2 at 26^-63;
Vol. 6 at 626-28).

Just after the concertf at about 10:00 p.m.,

he tried to call the Brian Oliver residence in Park City to warn
his friend, Greg Oliver, that there was an arrest warrant about
to be served on him and to get out ot town (Pt. Tr. 97; Tr. Vol.
2 at 264, 265-66).

Defendant had dirticulty with whomever he was

speaking to and became quite agitated when they hung up on him
(Tr. Vol. 2 at 265-66).

When his friend, Tom Greco, who had

overheard tne end ot tne conversation, asKed him wnat was wrong,
he said he was tired of everyone butting into his personal
business and "tucking" with him.
266-67, 291.)

(Ptl. Tr. 97; Tr. Vol. 2 at

He appeared to Greco to be very upset about not

being able to reach Greg or Brian Oliver and about tne call in
general.

His anxiousness got worse as the night progressed (Tr.

Vol. 2 at 269) . Detenoant denied making tnis call and claims he
asked Greco to call the Oliver home and leave the message (Tr.
Vol. 6 at 632-33).
Patricia Tyrell answered a call at tne Oliver home just
after 10:00 p.m. (Tyrell 30). The caller identified himself as
"Tom" and asKed to speak to Brian Oliver (Tyrell 8-9). 2

When

o

Several witnesses testified that they either knew tne detenaant
by the name "Tom White" or that he used both his real name,
Preston Mitchell, and the "Tom White" alias (Tr. Vol. 3 at 330,
341; Tyrell 10; Tr. Vol. 2 at 177, 246, 258).

Tyrell told the caller that Brian was sleeping and tnat she did
not want to disturb him# the caller became irate and swore at
Tyrell (Tyrell 8) . Fred Duncan, seeing tnat Tyrell was having
ditticulties with the call, took the phone from her and told the
caller tnat Brian would not be disturbed.

When the caller

continued to swear over the phone, Duncan hung up on him.

He

removed the phone from tne receiver so tnat no furtner calls
could come in, turned otf all the lights in the house, locked the
doors, and returned with Tyrell to watch television wmxe lying
on the living room tloor (Tyrell 8-12).
Hank Verrone, a friend ot Brian Oliver, received a call
in Park City from Tom Greco at 10:30 p.m. (Tyrell 30; Tr. Vol. 2
at 2/z,

293). Greco said that he had been trying to reach Brian

Oliver and that Fred [Duncan] had the phone otf the hook. He
asicea Verrone to go to Brian's house and tell Fred to put tne
phone back on the hook so he could contact Brian.

Shortly

tnerearter, Verrone went to Brian's house and delivered tne
message to Duncan (Tyrell 12-13)•

Duncan told Verrone tnat the

phone was off the hook because he did not want Brian disturbed,
and it was going to stay otf the hook (Ptl. Tr. 76-78; Tyrell
li.)

At trial, Greco admitted making tnis call, but testified

that he did not tell Verrone that Duncan would not let him talk
to Brian Oliver (Tr. Vol. 2 at 293).
After the concert, the defendant, Greco, and Kim
Mitchell lett the otner two women in their party at the Green
Parrot, a private club in Salt Lake City (Tr. Vol. 2 at 267-68).
Greco and Kim lett detenaant in tne parking lot ot defendant1s

friend1s, Ralph Garner*s, downtown apartment complex at about
10:45 p.m. and subsequently took a room at the Sheraton Hotel at
detenaant's request (Tr. Vol. 2 at 268-69).

At Garner's

apartment, the defendant took a large amount of cash and a blue
canvas bag containing a .45 caliber automatic pistol in its
holster (Tr. Vol. 2 at 269-70; Vol. 6 at 636-38).

Greco returned

to the Sheraton (Tr. Vol. 2 at 271) , and the detenaant walked to
the Hotel Utah (Tr. Vol. 6 at 639), where he took a cab to Greg
Oliver's condominium in Park West (Tr. Vol. 3 at 411; Tr. Vol. 6
at 640) .
Between 11:00 and 11:30 p.m., as Duncan and Tyrell were
lying on the living room tloor of the Brian Oliver home, an armed
gunman kicked down trie front door, burst into the living room,
stepped to the victim, Fred Duncanf said "You bastard," and shot
him once in the head (Tyrell 13-26, 31). Tyrell rolled towards
the door and stood.

The assailant passed her.

At tnat time, she

heard tne "pop" ot the gun, ran through tne open door, fell over
the front porch railing, ran through the gate, and down the
street (Tyrell 16-28).
Tyrell ran approximately five houses down tne street
and into a house with lights on.

From there, the owner of the

house helped her call the police, who arrived witnin five minutes
(Tyrell 26-30).
Tyrell.

The otticers went to the Brian Oliver home with

They tound the victim lying dead trom a gunshot wound to

the head (Pti. Tr. 36-37; Tyrell 34).
At about 2:00 a.m. on August 5, 1984, defendant called
an acquaintance, Ray Forbush, who lived in the Park City area,

and told him he had been in a car accident and was too
intoxicated to drive.

He asked Forbush to pick him up at the Red

Pine Condominiums (Tr. Vol. 3 at 329-3J1.)

When Forbush picked

the defendant up, the defendant appeared wet, dirtyf disheveled
and upset,

forbush took the defendant to his home, where

defendant called Ralph Garner and asked him to drive from Salt
Lake City and pick him up (Tr. Vol. 3 at 331-336, 408-09.)
Defendant also showered at the Forbush home (Tr. Vol. 3 at 337.)
At 2:10 a.m., detenaant placed a collect call from
Forbush's house to his friend, Sean Sears, in Miami, Florida
(Ptl. Tr. 87-89, 91; Tr. Vol. 2 at 254; Vol. 3 at 3J6; . Jeanette
Guffey, the AT&T operator who handled the call, while in the
course ot her employment, overheard the beginnings ot their
conversation while she was waiting for the release button she had
pushed to "drop" the call to a private line.

Detenaant had

identitied himself to the operator as "Preston" and had told her
the call was an emergency (Ptl. Tr. 89)• Atter Sears accepted
the charges, the operator overheard Preston say there had been an
accident, that someone had tried to rip him off, and he had
killed them (Ptl. Tr. 92-93, 250-53).

Ms. Gutfey later notitied

tne authorities and told Park City Police Chiet Frank Bell ot the
call (Ptl. Tr. 94).
Greco had gone to Garner's apartment in Salt Lake City
to check on the defendant (Tr. Vol. 3 at 274) and was there when
the detenaant phoned Garner requesting that Garner come to Park
City and pick him up.

Greco rode with Garner to the Forbush

home, arriving at approximately 3:00 a.m. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 2/8-79).

The detenaant took Garner aside in the Forbusn garage and told
Garner he had gone to Brian's house, there was a scuttle with
Duncan, and the gun had gone off (Tr. Vol. 2 at 28U; Vol. 3 at
4109 415). He told Garner he panicked, ran and dumped the gun in
a pond (Tr. Vol. 3 at 411). On the return to Salt Lake City, tne
defendant wore a robe belonging to the Forbushes (Tr. Vol. 3 at
338; 374) , and discarded his soiled clothing in tne garbage
dumpster at Garner's apartment complex in Salt Lake City (Tr.
Vol. 2 at 282: Vol. 3 at 412).
Within a few days ot the shooting, tne detendant paid
Kari Garner, Ralph Garner's then girlfriend, to take him to Las
Vegas (Tr. Vol. 3 at 374) • He carried a large amount ot cash
with him (Tr. Vol. 3 at 379). During the trip to Las Vegas,
detenaant told Kari that he had killed Duncan and that it was an
accident or mix up (Tr. Vol. 3 at 380, 396-97).
At trial, several witnesses testified tnat the
defendant and Fred Duncan, the victim, disliked each other and
that there was long-running animosity between the two. Greg
Oliver described Duncan's and defendant's relationship as a
"mutual hatred" (Tr. Vol. 6 at 778). Tyrell knew tnat Duncan
disliked the defendant "immensely" (Tyrell 35-36).

Brian Oliver

had even asked the detendant not to come by his house while
Duncan was there because he knew of the animosity defendant and
Duncan telt for each otner (Tr. Vol. 2 at lb7-68).

Greco also

testified that there were always bad feelings between the
detenaant and Duncan (Tr. Vol. 2 at 2b0-61, 288) .

Several witnesses testified that the defendant had two
.45 caliber automatic or semi-automatic weapons prior to the
murder and kept several guns at his house in Park Meadows (Tr.
Vol. 224, 168-69, 250, 260-61).
Ray Forbush and his wite, Debra, were both called by
the State to testify.

After defendant told Ray he was in a car

accident, Ray drove to tne alleged accident scene and found no
sign of an accident (Tr. Vol. 3 at 337-38).

Ray and his wife

also helped Ralph Garner and Kim Mitchell remove defendant's
personal belongings, including his gun collection, from his
rented house in Park Meadows on August 5 and 6, 1984 (Tr. Vol. 3
at 339-344).

Both Ray and Debra Forbush testitied tnat defendant

was wearing slacks, a shirt, and shoes (not boots) at the time
they saw him (Tr. Vol. 3 345-350, 355).
Ralph Garner testified that the detenaant asKed him to
look for the blue canvas bag near the old high school the day
atter the shooting (Tr. Vol. 3 at 413; . He further testified
that, while he and Kari were in Las Vegas with the defendant,
detenaant admitted shooting Duncan, but said it was an accident
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 415). Defendant told Garner he was afraid to turn
himself in because he was atraid no one would believe it was an
accident (Tr. Vol. 3 at 416)• Garner also testified tnat he had
had several drug dealings with the detenaant in the previous two
years, the last one on August 5, 1984, the day after the shooting
(Tr. Vol. 3 at 406).
During the investigation, the police recovered tne gun
from a pond at the Park City Golf Course (Tr. Vol. 2 at 187-88,

322-24) .

This gun matched a casing found on the floor near the

victim at the Oliver home (Tr. Vol. 2 at 203-210)•

Tests on the

spent shell found in the pillow near the victim's head were
inconclusive (Tr. Vol. 2 at 209-10, 237-39).

The blue canvas

bag, with a holster for a .45 caliber automatic inside, was found
in some weeds near the high school (Tr. Vol. 2 at 230-35).
Defendant tooK the stand and testified in his own
behalf (Tr. Vol. 6 at 618-750).

He claims that Tom Greco made

the call from the pay phone near the Salt Palace to tne Oliver
home at 10:00 p.m. (Tr. Vol. 6 at 632-33).

Greco denies making

tnis calif but testified that he did overhear defendant make tne
call (Tr. Vol. 2 at 293). Defendant indicated he was concerned
for the satety ot his friena, Greg Oliverf who had had a bad drug
deal with one Mike Shane, who was tnreatening Greg with impending
bodily harm (Tr. Vol. 6 at 620-21) .

When defendant could not

reach Greg, either at his condo or his father's house, or his
fatner, Brian, he went to Park City to warn Greg or his fatner
that Greg should get out of town (Tr. Vol. 6 at 633-35).
Defendant claims Greco gave him the blue canvas bag containing
the loaded .45 caliber gun and holster (Tr. Vol. 6 at 636-38).
Defendant asserted that, as he approached Brian
Oliver's house, he thought it unusual that Brian, who was usually
a late-night entertainer on weekends, had all his lights out (Tr.
Vol. 6 at 641). Feeling that foul play had already occurred or
was occurring in the house, he looked in Brian's bedroom window
and saw who he thought to be Brian lying on the bed (Tr. Vol. 6
at 646-47) .

His anxiety increased when he could not wake Brian

by knocking on the bedroom windows (Tr. Vol. 6 at 647) . He moved
to the living room window and, looking in, saw two prone figures
lying on the floor in front ot the television.

He says, at tne

time, he thought they were hiding (Tr. Vol. 6 at 649-51).

He

claims he thought he saw a movement in the dining area (Tr. Vol.
6 at 653). Fearing the worst, he kicked in the door and moved
toward tne dining area.

As he did so, something caught him at

the knees, he fell on top of Duncan, and the gun discharged,
striking Duncan in the head, killing him (Tr. Vol. 6 at 621-65458).

He said he panicked and ran through the fields and forest

to Red Pines Condominiums in Park West, where he called Ray
Forbush to pick him up.

He testitied tnat he tnrew the blue bag

containing tne holster in some bushes and tne gun in some water
somewhere along the way (Tr. Vol. 6 at 659-563).

Defendant was

apprehended in October, 198b, some fourteen montns later, in
Springfield, Missouri, by an F.B.I, agent.
FACTS RELATING TO TTRELL'S TESTIMONY AMD DEFENDANT'S PRETRIAL
MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
During the last minutes ot August 4, 1984, and eany
hours of August 5, 1984, just after Tyrell had witnessed the
shooting ot her fiance, she gave a description ot the gunman to
police orticers investigating the crime (R. 1277-78).

She told

Otticer Kip Ingersoll the assailant was a tail male, wearing dark
clothes, possibly shorts, who carried a small black handgun (Ptl.
Tr. 36,43).

Later at the Park City clinic, she told Chier Bell

she saw a male, approximately six feet tall, medium build,
wearing dark clothing, and carrying a smooth flat pistol like
what she had seen and knew to be an automatic (Ptl. Tr. 59).

Chief Bell interviewed Tyrell again in his office on
August 6, 1*84, just two days after.the murder (R. 542-99).
Tyrell described the gunman as dressed all in black, wearing long
pants, carrying a black gun, approximately four to five inches
long, with a clip*

She said she could not see his face but heard

him say "you bastard" just before he shot Duncan.
sounaed familiar to her (R. 58^-87) .

The voice

She also told Chier Bell

she had met defendant in Miami once over a year earlier,
detenaant knew Duncan did not like him, and Duncan's dislike for
defendant was "immense" (R. 595-96).
Tyrell was bothered by tne fact that she could not
relate more details of the incident (Tyrell 102-03).

On October

19, 1984, only ten weeks after the murder, Tyrell, on her own
initiative, went to Dr. Hillroyd, a clinical psychologist, at the
University ot California at Los Angeles (U.C.L.A.).
69, 100, 102-03; R. 282).

(Tyrell 68-

She underwent hypnosis in hopes of

regaining her memory ot the details ot that night (R. 510; Tyrell
100).

Dr. Hillroyd's hypnotism of Tyrell was independent of the

police investigation and prosecution and was not influenced
thereby.

Tyrell and Dr. Hillroyd were alone during the session,

and the session was not suggestive or leading (Tr. Vol. 1 at 8990).

Additionally, Dr. Hillroyd conducted and taped the

prehypnosis interview ot Tyrell, which was transcribed and
presented as evidence at the pretrial suppression hearing and at
triax.

She also videotaped the hypnosis session itself, which

Tyrell later reviewed and which was also presented as evidence at
the pretrial suppression hearing (Memorandum in Opposition to

Detenaanfs Motion to Suppress Tyrell1s Testimony—Exhibits A and
B.

Ptl. Tr. 58-60, 64, 65; Tr. Vol, 1 at 75; Tyrell 85-86, 100)

(R. 272-87) •) Defense counsel was provided with tne prehypnosis
and hypnosis statements, as was the district court (R. 10, 47,
316; Tr* Vol. 1 at 75) .
During tne ptfihypnosis interview, Tyrell described tne
man she saw.

she said she saw hair on his legs, like he was

wearing shorts.

He seemed to be dressed in black.

He had

goldish-medium blond hair, unkept, thick and curly.

She told Dr.

Hillroyd the gunman said "you bastard" and Duncan said "No," and
then she heard the gun go off (R. 2 81).^
At trial, Tyrell's general description ot tne gunman
was consistent with her earlier descriptions (Tyrell 21-24).

She

further testified that the defendant was the gunman who burst
into the Brian Oliver home and shot Duncan in the head (Tyrell
24-25, 36). She said she recognized tne assailant's voice as tne
defendant's (Tyrell 23, 84) and could identify the defendant as
the gunman because he had distinctive legs and a unique walk
(wnat she identified as knock-knees or "duck-legs"), as did the
assailant (Tyrell 62-67 5)•

She further noted tne gunman wore a

nylon stocking over his head and face (Tyrell 23-24).
3

Although the videotape ot tne hypnosis session was presented to
the trial court, it is not part ot the record on appeal.
Thererore, the detenaant has failed to supply a sufficient record
to determine the inadmissibility of Tyrell1s posthypnosis
testimony on the basis ot its reliability. For this reason
alone, defendant's appeal could be dismissed. State v. Qlmos 712
P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681 (Utah I98t>) .
£t. Hanley v. State. 624 P.2d 1387, 1391-92 (Nev. 1981), and
People v. Home* 619 P.2d 53 (Colo. Iy80) (where presentence
report's omission from record on appeal required dismissal of
sentencing challenge).

In addition, Tyrell stated that she did not tell Chief
Bell on August 4 and 6, 1984, tnat she knew the gunman was the
detenaant because her brotner, who was present at the August 6
interview, had advised her to say as little as possible until she
could obtain counsel, and because defendant was still at large
and she was afraid for her own safety should she identify him
(Ptl. Tr. 80, Tyrell 25, 42, 77, 92). She testified tnat tne
description of the defendant given at the early interviews was,
however, accurate (Tyrell 93).
Prior to trial, the detenaant filed motions to suppress
both Tyrell1s hypnotically refreshed testimony and testimony
obtained trom Jeanette Guffey's interception ot detenaantfs
telephone call to Sean Sears on the night of the murder (R. 415,
4b3) • These motions were heard on January 16, 1986, just before
the jury was impaneled (Tr. Vol. 1 at 72-108, 123-35).
On the motion regarding Tyrell1s testimony, tne
defendant presented expert witness evidence tnat hypnosis does
not meet the general acceptance Frye test (Tr. Vol. 1 at 7/-96) ,
and the state proffered independent corroborative testimony of
Tyrell1s post-hypnosis statements, namely tne admissions ot
defendant to Kari Garner, Ralph Garner, and Sean Sears tnat he
haa shot Duncan (Tr. Vol. 1 at 97-10/).

The trial court ruled

that there was sufficient independent corroboration (Tr. Vol. 1
at 98) and suosequently denied tne motion (R. 60/-691)•
On the motion regarding the intercepted telephone
conversation, the trial judge tound that the conversation was not
wiltully intercepted and was, therefore, lawful (R. 606). This
motion was also denied (R. 606, 689; Tr. Vol. 1 at 13b).

SUMMARY OP ARGUMEMT
This Court should adopt the majority rule that
hypnotically refreshed memory testimony is admissible and tnat
the prior hypnosis ot the witness atfects the credibility/ not
admissibilityf ot her testimony.

Moreover, even if the testimony

ot Patricia Tyrell were improperly admitted in the instant case,
any error to the defendant was harmless.
The AT&T operator's inadvertent interception ot the
defendant's collect telephone call from Park West to Sean Sears
in Miami, Florida, heard while she was perrormmg duties
necessary to her employment, is wholly within Utah Code Ann. S
7/-23a-2(a)(i) (1^8^) and theretore lawful.

Consequently, it was

proper to admit that conversation and any evidence derived
thererrom.
APgPMEHT
JEQIWT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ADMITTING PATRICIA TYRELL "S
POSTHYPNOTIC TESTIMONY.
Detendant argues that his conviction should be reversed
and, at the very least, remanded for a new trial, on the grounds
that the trial court failed to limit the testimony ot Patricia
Tyrell to prehypnosis testimony.
for two reasons.

This argument should be rejected

First, under the majority and better reasoned

rule, hypnotically refreshed memory testimony is admissible, and
the fact that a witness has been hypnotized goes to weight, not
admissibility.

Second, even if this Court were to hold

hypnotically retreshed memory testimony inadmissible, that portion
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ot Patricia Tyrell's testimony that might have resulted from
hypnotic refreshing was not critical to the outcome of the present
case.

Theretore, its admission constituted, at most, harmless

error.
A. THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE MAJORITY HOLE
THAT HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED TESTIMONY IS
ADMISSIBLE AMD THAT THE WITNESS1 PREVIOUS
HYPNOSIS AFFECTS CREDIBILITY, NOT
ADMISSIBILITY.
The issue ot admissibility ot testimony trom a
previously hypnotized witness is a question ot first impression in
the State ot Utah which lends itself to no easy solution.4
Courts have almost uniformly held tnat evidence derived from a
witness while he is in a hypnotic trance is unreliable and must be
excluded.

However, a more complex problem arises when, as in the

case at bar, a witness uses hypnosis to retresh her recollection
ot the event is subsequently asked to testify about tnat event at
triai.

Under this factual setting, jurisdictions have taken

essentially tnree different approaches regarding the use of
testimony trom witnesses whose memories have been enhanced by
hypnosis.

In State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983), the

Court defined tfce tnree different approaches as follows:
The majority of jurisdictions appear to
have declared that hypnotically induced
testimonial recall generally poses no barrier
to admissibility, but, ratner, attects only
the weight of the testimony. The federal
courts have adopted tnis rule. See United
States Yt AwKard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.),
££££• denied. 444 U.S. 885, 100 S. Ct. 1/9,

62 L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); United States Yt
* This issue was presented in State v. Tuttle, Supreme Court Case
No. 20068, but this Court has not yet ruled in tnat case.
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hOms., 581 F.2d 1983 (9th Cir.), £e_r_fc.
iianieji, 439 U.S. 1006, 99 S. Ct. 621, 58 L.
Ed. 2d 683 (1978); United States v. Waksal.
539 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Fla. 1982); United

States Vi Narcisor 44t F. supp. 252 (E.D.
Mich. 1977). See generally Annot.. 50 A.L.R.
Fed. 602 (198u). The same approach has been
taken in Georgia [Creamer v. State. 232 Ga.
136, 205 S.E.2d 240 (1974); Illinois fPeople
v. Smrekar. 68 111. App. 3d 379, 24 111. Dec.
70/, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979)]; Indiana [Pearson
Y« State, Ind., 441 N.E.2d 468 (1982); Moxaail
v. State, Ind. App., 445 N.E.2d 585 (1983)];
Louisiana [State v. Wren. 425 So. 2d 756 (La.
1983)1; Missouri [State v. Greer. 609 S.W.2d
423 (Mo.Ct.App.1980), vacated on oth*r
grounds. 450 U.S. 102/, 101 S. Ct. 173a, 68
L. Ed. 2d 222 (1981)]; North Carolina [State
v. McQueen. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 4l4
(1978)]; Oregon [State y, Brom,, 8 Or. App.
598, 494 P.2d 434 (1972); State v. Joraensen.
8 Or.App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1978)J; Tennessee
[State v. Glebock. 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Cr.
App.1981)J; and Wyoming [Chapman v. State.
63b P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 198/)]. See generally
Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
Other courts have allowed the admission
of hypnotically induced testimony subject to
compliance with certain procedural sateguards
designed to ensure reliability. These
jurisdictions include Florida [Brown v.
S_£a_t£, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983)]; New Jersey [State v. Hurd. 86 N.J.
525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981)]; New Mexico fState
v. Beachum. 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 24b (Ct.
App. 1981)J; and Washington] State v. Martinf
33 Wash. App. 486, 656 P.2d 526 (198/); State
v. Long. 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 845
(1982)].
Recently, a number or jurisdictions have held
that a witness who has undergone pre-trial
hypnosis is incompetent to testify as to the
subject matter discussed at the hypnotic
session, and, thus, that persons's testimony
is per se inadmissible. These jurisdictions
include Arizona [State v. Mena. 128 Ariz.
226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1981) J; California
[People v. Shiney. 31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal.
Rptr. 243, 641 P.2d 775, ££JL£. denied.
U.S.
, 103 S. Ct. 13, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1400
(1982)]; Maryland [Collins v. State. 52 Md.
App. 186, 44/ A.2d 1//2 (1982); Polk v.
16-

fijtaifir 48 Md. App. 382, 417 A.2d 1041
(1981)J; Michigan [People Yt Gonzales, 415
Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743 (198^)]; Minnesota
[State v, Mackl, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn.
198U)]; Nebraska [State v. Palmer, 210 Neb.
206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981; and Pennsylvania
[Com, v. Nazarovitch. 49b Pa. 978, 436 A.2d
170 (1981)].
337 N.W.2d at 149 (tootnote omitted).
It is impossible to reconcile the approaches set forth
by tne above courts or to arrive at a rule which will entirely
satisfy all the demands of logic, policy, and practicality.
However, as indicated in the following argument, this Court should
adopt the position of the majority of states and the federal
courts which permits the testimony to be admitted and allows tne
jury to determine its weight.
Utah R. Evid. 601 provides:
Every person is competent to be a
witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules.
In BxflHUr 337 N.W.2d at 138, the North Dakota Supreme Court relied
on an identical rule of evidence in holding tnat hypnosis affects
the weight, but not the admissibility ot testimony.

Brown

attacked and sexually assaulted a 19-year old woman and left her
in a confused and upset state.

She described her assailant as

heavy-set and wearing blue jeans and leather boots, with long dark
hair and possibly a beard.

The victim saw the defendant on tne

street when returning to the crime scene and indicated tnat he
could have been the individual who attacked her, but she was not
sure.

However, after being placed under hypnosis, the victim was

shown a photographic lineup containing a picture ot the detenaant
from which she made a positive identitication of defendant as her
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assailant.

She also positively identified tne detenaant as her

assailant at the preliminary hearing and at trial over the
objection ot detense counsel*

Atter considering tne various

positions taken by other jurisdictions, the North Dakota court
held tnat most post-hypnotic testimony is admissible unaer tne
following rationale:
Having carefully considered tne pros and
cons of the various positions adopted by the
courts in deciding tnis issue, and having
weighed the benefits of hypnotically inauced
recall testimony against tne inherent risks,
we are not convinced that a witness should be
renaerea incompetent to testify merely
because he or she was hypnotized during the
investigatory phase ot a criminal case. Rule
6 01 ot the North Dakota Rules of Evidence
provides that: "Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otherwise provided in
these rules." Our rules ot evidence do not
provide that a previously hypnotized witness
is incompetent to testify. We believe tnat
an attack on credibility is the proper method
ot determining the value ot hypnotically
induced testimony. See Rule 607, N.D.R. Ev.;

Chapman$ supra, 63b p.2d at lzb4.
Accordingly, we align ourselves with the
majority ot jurisdictions which have held
that hypnosis affects credibility but not
admissibility.
337 N.W.2d at 151.
In People v. Smrekar, 6B 111. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d
848 (1979), the Fourth District of the Illinois Appellate Court
also considered whetner identification by a witness was admissible
after the witness had been subjected to hypnosis.

The witness was

, able to identify the detenaant in a homicide case atter a hypnosis
session, although she admitted prior to being hypnotized tnat ner
chances ot being able to identity tne person she saw were only
"50-50."

The Court allowed the testimony of the previously
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hypnotized witness.

In response to detenaant*s argument that the

prior hypnosis suggested defendant's identitication to the witness
and deprived the detenaant ot cross-examination, the court
responded:
Detenaant bases his claim ot error
partly upon a deprivation of his right to
cross-examine the previously hypnotized
witness. However, the ability to crossexamine the witnesses is one element tnat
distinguishes the use of testimony of the
previously hypnotized witness from tne
impermissible procedure of introducing
testimony ot tne hypnotist as to the
statements made to him by the patient
while unaer hypnosis. While tne hypnosis
could atfect the mind of the witness in
such a suoconscious way tnat the crossexamination could not reach, all witnesses
are, to some extent, suo^ect to suoconscious
stimuli similarly obscure.
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305 N.E.2d at 855»5
* Compare People Vt zayasr

m . App. 3d

,

N.E.2d

,

slip op. no* 84-1400 (June 26, 1987) (In triple murder case,
officer's hypnotically enhanced testimony regarding tne license
number ot the assailant's get-away car was ruled inadmissible as
not reliable, but pre-hypnotic recollections were held
admissible), provided in Addendum A. Zayas can be distinguished
on severax grounas. First, in Zayas, the First District, Fitth
Division, Illinois Appellate Court, noted tnat the Fourth
District ot tnat court reartirmed its holding in Smrekar in
People v. Gibson, 117 111. App. 3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368 (1983).
It furtner notea tnat tne Smrekar approach was also adopted by
the First District, Third Division, of the Illinois Appellate
Court in People v. Jordan, 120 111. App. 3d 836, 458 N.E.2d 1115
(1983), the Third District, in People v. Byas, 117 111. App. 3d
979, 453 N.E.2d 1141 (1983), and the Fitth District in People v.
Cahoon. 120 111. App. 3d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998 (1983). qahoon was
suosequently overruled by the Illinois Supreme Court, but tnis
reversal was based on that Courts general determination that, in
any event, the identitication at issue was impermissibly
suggestive. People v. Cahoon, 104 111. 2d 295, 472 N.E.2d 403
(1984) . Based on Cahoon, the Fifth Appellate District has since
ruled that a trial court properly excluded a clinical
psychologist's testimony tnat, wniie unaer hypnosis, the
defendant non-verbally denied committing the offenses in
question. People v. Duckett, 133 111. App. 3d 639, 479 N.E.2d
355 (1985). While that Court generally noted possible
deticiencies in hypnosis testimony, that case can be
distinguished from cases where hypnoticaxly enhanced testimony is
admitted in tnat the expert was testifying as to tne detenaant's
hearsay statements made while under typnosis. The Zayas court
tnererore improperly extenas tne holding in the distinguishable
case ot Duckett, 133 111. App. 3d 639, 479 N.E.2d 3b5 (1*85), to
rule tnat all hypnosis testimony is inadmissible. Zayas, slip
op. No. 84-1400 at 6 (Addendum A ) .
Secona, the Zayas court neglects to list most federal court cases
which hold hypnotically refreshed testimony admissible and fails
to list several state jurisdictions which also hold. Compare
State v. Brown, 337 N.W.2d 138 (N.D. 1983), cited in this brief
at lb-lb, SiiSLAi a nd People v. Zayas. slip op. at 6 (Addendum A) .
And third, these federal court decisions are more persuasive
because they rely on tne Federal Rules ot Evidence, which tne
Utah legislature adopted verbatim with few specitic exceptions.
See discussion at 25; Utah Court Rules Ann. at 63*; Advisory
Committee notes to Utah R. Evid. Rules 102, 601 and 607 (1987).
Illinois1 evidence rules are not patterned atter the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 110A ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1982).
And fourtn, the reasoning in &a&as is not applicable to Utah
cases because it erroneously applied the Frye standard for expert
scientific opinion testimony to a lay witness* factual testimony.
Further, under Fed. R. Evid. Rules 702, 703 and 704 (and Utah R.
Evid. Rules 702, 703 and 704) , the frye general acceptance test
no longer applies. Point I.B.
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Similarly, in State v. Joroensen. 492 P.2d 312 (1971) ,
the court stated:
Since both ot these witnesses gave their
testimony concerning the issues of the case
in open court and were subjected to prolonged
and rigorous cross-examination by defendant's
counsel betore the jury, we do not believe
that the fact they had been subjected to
certain psychiatric and medical examinations
and procedures prior to testifying, which
were fully exposed in the evidence, would be
a basis for disallowing their testimony.
Nor would tne fact that Mrs. Essex had told
different stories at previous times be a basis
for disallowing tneir testimony. Detenaant's
strenuous objections to their testimony both
at trial and on appeal go to its weight ratner
than its admissibility.
492 P.2d at 315 (citations omitted).
In Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982), the
victim/witness found an intruder in his home upon returning from
work.

A struggle ensued wherein the intruder struck the witness

on tne hand and above the right eye with a hammer and tnen fled.
The witness gave a general description of the intruder after the
incident.

Added details to the previous description were given

after the witness was twice hypnotized by city police otficers.
The detense attorney objected to the witness's identification
testimony, since it was enhanced by the use of hypnosis. In
holding tne testimony admissible, the court stated:
The jury had before it the circumstances
ot the identitication, including tne part
played therein by the hypnotic sessions.
Appellant*s attack on tne credibility ot
the witness was before the jury. The
success ot such attack was for determination
by the jury.
The majority ot tne States are in accord.
Such testimony is allowed, leaving it to the
fact finder to gauge tne credibility ot it
-21-

on the basis ot that presented to tne fact
tinder concerning the affect [sic] of
hypnotism generally and in tne specific case.
(Citations omitted.) 638 P.2d at 1282.
In so holding, the Court relied on Rules 601 and 607 ot
the Wyoming Rules of Evidence, which are identical to Rules 601
and 607 ot the Utah Rules ot Evidence.

These rules provide:

RULE 601. Every person is competent to
be a witness except as otnerwise provided in
these rules.
Rule 607. The credibility ot a witness
may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him.
In the recent case ot Gee v. State* 662 P.2d lu3 (Wyo.
1983)f the Wyoming Supreme Court reartirmed its decision in
Chapman* but added that the State must alert the defenaant to tne
fact of its witness1 prior hypnosis and any statement or
proceedings concerning the hypnosis session must be made available
to the defense.

These safeguards have been met in the case at bar

Point I.C. at 33-34, infra.
In Pearson v. State. 441 N.E.2d 468 (Ind. 1982) , tne
court allowed the witness1 identification testimony despite a
ratner tainted hypnotic session.

The hypnotist was a state police

officer with some informal hypnosis training, ratner than an
impartial psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in tne use ot
hypnosis.

The investigating police orticer was present during the

tape recorded hypnosis session* but the tapes turned out to be
inaudible.

There was evidence of improper suggestion during the

hypnotic session* including the showing ot defendant's picture.
Despite these problems, the Court allowed the testimony with the
following explanation:

• . • [TJhe only facts which the victim
changed after the hypnosis session were the
color ot the detenaanfs shirt, the possibility that he was wearing a hatf and how
much ot his face she actually saw during the
crime. Her identitication of defendant and
her description ot the major incidents ot tne
crime were not changed. The jury was aware
ot the circumstances ot the identitication,
the procedures used during the hypnosis
session, and the changes in tne victim's
testimony after the hypnosis. The victim
was a competent witness with respect to tne
identitication of defendant and the necessary elements ot the corpus delecti about
which she had testified prior to the
hypnosis session. The determination ot the
weight of her testimony was for the jury.
We tind there was no error in the admission
of the victim's testimony and in the trial
court's overruling ot defendant's motion to
suppress and motion to dismiss based on this
issue.
441 N.E.2d at 4/3-74 (citation omitted).

The facts testified to

in the present case are nearly identical,

gee this briet, Point

I.D. at 35-37# infra, and the Statement ot Facts at 10-13, supra.
The Pearson decision was relied upon in Morgan v.
State, 445 N.E.2d 585 (1983).

In Morgan, two witnesses to a

murder and battery were hypnotized by a police otticerr and the
detenaant filed a pretrial motion to suppress their testimony.
This motion was deniedf and the witnesses were allowed to testify.
The fact that the hypnotist was not an indepenaent psychiatrist or
psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis and tnat the
sessions were conaucted in the presence ot tnird persons were
considered to be factors affecting the witnesses' credibilityf
ratner than renaering their testimony incompetent.
In State v. Glebock. 616 S.W.2d 897 (Tenn. Cr. App.
198i)

9

the court allowed tne testimony ot a victim ot a shooting
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incident wno was placed unaer hypnosis in an attempt to obtain
further information concerning the crime, and particularly a
license number ot a vehicle in question.

The court stated:

This is a question of first impression in
this state; but atter reading many
authorities, we think that the sound and
prevailing rule, though not universal, is
tnat stated by the 9th Circuit, U.S. Court of
Appeals in United States v. Adams. 581 F.2d
193, 198-199 (note 12)(9th Cir. 1978):
"Until today we have considerea only in
civil actions the admissibility of testimony
based on memories rerreshed unaer hypnosis.
We have held tnat the fact of hypnosis
attects credibility but not admissibility.
Kline v. Ford Motor Company. I n c . 523 F.2d
1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v.
Fairchiid Biller Corp># 503 F.2d 506, 509
(9th Cir.1974).
Other Courts considering this problem in
the context of criminal trials have generaxly
followed tne same approach. State v.
Jpggensenr 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312, 315-16
(1*71); Harding Vt gute, 5 Md. App. 230, 24t>
A.2d 302, 311-12 (1968). Reversals have been
predicated only on tne tanure to disclose
the fact of hypnosis. United States v.
MilifiJLf 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); Emmett
v.» Ricketts. 397 F. Supp. lu^5 (habeas writ
issued). We believe tnis reasoning is souna.
616 S.W.2d at 903.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Wren, 425 So.
2d 756 (La. 1983), and the Georgia Supreme Court, in qreamer v.
State. 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d 140 (1974), also held tnat tne
refreshment or enhancement of a witness' memory through hypnosis
. atfects credibility ratner than admissibility.
As indicated in State v. Brown. 337 N.W.2d at 138, the
Federal Courts have also adopted tne rule admitting tne testimony
of a witness who has been placed under hypnosis.
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Inasmuch as the

Utah Rules ot Evidence were modeled atter the Federal Rules ot
Evidence (Utah Court Rules Ann. at 639; Advisory Committee notes
to Utah R. Evid. Rules 102, 601 and 607 (1987), this Court should
follow the Federal position by ruling tnat the testimony of
Patricia Tyrell was properly admitted at trial.
This position is further supported by Utah R. Evid. 102
which spates:
These rules should be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of
unjustitiable expense and delay and promotion
of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end tnat the truth may be
ascertained and proceedings justly determined.
Disallowing tne testimony ot Patricia Tyrell would be inconsistent
with this admonition tnat the courts admit such evidence as will
assist in tne ascertainment ot truth.
The defendant challenges these decisions which hold
tnat hypnotically retreshed testimony goes to credibility, not
admissibility, on the ground tnat they preceded scientific
literature now denouncing this evidence as unreliable.
Defendant's Brief at 27-28.
several reasons.

See

This argument is unpersuasive for

First, there is scientitic evidence contrary to

defendant's position. £££. generally R* Udolf, Forensic Hypnosis
11-16 (198J) and authorities cited therein.

Second, even in tne

face of his protfered literature, the defendant cites only one
case listed in Rumi*

State Y» McQtfeen# 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d

414 (1974), that has been overruled.
515, 5J2, J19 S.E.2d 177, 187 (1984).

State v. Peoples, ill N.C.
Third, most ot these cases

holding for admissibility were decided from 1978 through 1986,
either in tne wake ot such literature or atter, when the material
-25-

was available for the courts1 consideration and deliberation.

See

Defendant's Briet, Table of Cases and Authorities# at v. And
fourths despite such literature, the most recent cases still hold
for admissibility.
In its recent decision in Rock v. Arkansas*

U.S.

# 107 S. Ct. 2704 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
considerea the constitutionality ot Arkansas' per se rule
excluding a criminal defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony.
Rock was charged with manslaughter for shooting her husoana.

To

refresh her memory as to the precise details of the shooting, she
twice underwent taped hypnosis by a trained neuropsychologist.
Afterwards, she remembered details indicating tnat the gun was
detective and had misfired.
expert witness testimony.

This evidence was corroborated by

However, the trial judge ruled tnat no

hypnotically rerreshed testimony would be admitted, thus limiting
the defendant's testimony to her statements made prior to
hypnosis.

The Arkansas Supreme Court attirmed her convictionf

ruling that the limitations on her testimony did not violate her
constitutional right to testity in her own behalf, and tnat
hypnotically refreshed testimony is so unreliable as to be
inadmissible per se.

The Court held tnat tnis per se rule

impermissibly infringed on a criminal defendant's right to testify
in her own behalf.

107 S. Ct. at 2714-15.

While Rock's claim and this decision were "bottomed on
her constitutional right to testity in her own defensel,!" the
Court did note that
[d]espite the unreliability tnat hypnosis
concededly may introducer . . . the procedure
-26-

has been credited as instrumental in obtaining
investigative leads or identitications tnat
were later confirmed by independent evidence.

&££r e.g. , People y, Hughes, 59 N.y.2d 523, 533,
453 N.E.2d 484, 488 (198J); pee generally R.
Udolf, Forensic Hypnosis 11-16 (1983).
The inaccuracies tne process introduces can be reduced, although perhaps not eliminated, by the
use ot procedural sareguards. • • • The more
traditional means of assessing accuracy ot
testimony also remain applicable in tne case ot
a previously hypnotized defendant. Certain
information recalled as a result ot hypnosis may
be verified as highly accurate by corroborating
evidence. Cross-examination, even in the face ot
a contident defendant, is an effective tool for
revealing inconsistencies. Moreover, a jury can
be educated to the risks of hypnosis through
expert testimony and cautionary instructions.
Id. at 2713-14. While the Supreme Court noted tnat it was
expressing no opinion on the admissibility ot testimony ot
previously hypnotized witnesses other than the criminal defendant,
Rock. 107 S. Ct. 2712 n. 15, all ot the above arguments delmeatea
by the Court are equally applicable to a witness1 hypnotically
rerresned testimony and support the majority position allowing
this testimony to be admitted at trial. Rock also cites many of
the same cases discussed here in support ot its analysis. Id., at
2713 n. 16.
Several post-1985 opinions, even in tne face ot
defendant's literature, show continuing support for the
admissibility hypnotically refreshed testimony.

See, e.g..

McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987)
(reliability evaluation); Beck v. Norns, 8Ul F.2d 242, 244-45
(6th Cir. 1986) (hypnotically enhanced testimony admissible if
procedural sateguards followed); and Wicker v. McCotter. 783 F.2d

487, 492-93 (5th Cir. l*8t>) (probative value ot testimony weighed
against its prejudicial etfect)# cert,
(198b)•

flenied*

U.S.

In both Garrison and McCotter . the circuit courts

advocated conducting an individualized inquiry in each case. See
fll££ United States v. Kimbenin, 805 F.2d 210, 21* (7th Cir.
1986)? Barter V, Marylandr 800 F.2d 437, 441-43 (4th Cir. 1986);
Clay Vt VQSSr 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 198b); Sprynczynatyk v. General
Motors CorPtf 771 F.2d 1 H 2 (8th Cir. Iy85) , ££JL£. ££Ri£&,
U.S.

, 106 S. Ct. 12b3 (1986); State v. King. 84 Or. App. 16s,

7J3 P.2d 472 (1987); Haselhuhn v. State, 727 P.2d 280 (Wyo. 1986);
State V. ClarKf 104 N.M. 434, 722 P.2d 685, 691 (1986); PQtS yf
££&££# 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985).
B. THIS COURT SHOULD HOT APPLY THE FRYE TEST
TO DISALLOW THE TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA TYRELL.
Those courts which have rerused to admit hypnotically
refreshed testimony have generally relied upon the "general
acceptance" or "Frye Rule" originally set forth in Frye v. Unitea
States, 293 F. Iul3 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

These courts reason that

tne testimony ot a witness wno has undergone hypnosis to retresn
memory recall is J2£JL ££. inadmissible in a criminal trial because
hypnosis* as a means ot obtaining accurate recall, has not gained
general scientitic acceptance.
Many courts have criticized tne application ot tne
"Frye Rule" to hypnotically induced testimony.

In Brown v. StateP

42b So. 2d 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. ly8i), tne court stated:
. . . [W]e conclude that the method by
which testimony is hypnotically induced is
not one tnat falls within the ambit of Frye"[Technically the test is not directly
applicable because it is concerned with the
-28-

admissibility ot expert opinion deduced trom
the results of a scientific technique, such
as a lie detector test, and not with tne
admissibility of eyewitness testimony." (426
So. 2d 89). Note, The Admissibility ot
Testimony Intluenced by Hypnosis, 67 Va. L.
Rev. 1203, 1217 (198i) (e.s.); accord,

Commonwealth Vt Juvenilef 381 Mass. 727, 423
N.E.2d 339, 342-343 (1980). Our view is
supported by tnat ot tne New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Hurd, which observed:
Unlike the courts in Mena* supra,
and Mack, Sdl£L£? the court below
did not demand, as a precondition
of admissibility, tnat hypnosis be
generally accepted as a means ot
reviving truthtul or historically
accurate recall. We tnink tnis was
correct. The purpose of using
hypnosis is not to obtain trutn, as
a polygraph or "truth serum" is
supposed to do. Instead, hypnosis
is employed as a means ot
overcoming amnesia and restoring
the memory of a witness. See

Spector & Foster, Admissibility pfc
Hypnctic Statements; Is the Law of
gvidence Susceptible?* 38 Ohio st.
L.J. 567, 584 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . . . . In
light ot tins purpose, hypnosis can
be considered reasonably reliable
if it is able to yield recollections as accurate as those of an
ordinary witness, whicn likewise
are often historically inaccurate.
4i2 A.2d at 92. JSfi£ also Stfrte Vt
Bfiadmmr 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246,
252 (Ct. App. 1981). (426 So. 2d
at 89, 90) .
Id. at 89-90.
In Wisconsin v. Armstrong, 110 Wis. 2d 5bb, 329 N.W.2d
386 (1983), the court commented on the application of the frye
rule to the admissibility ot testimony attectea by hypnosis,
stating:
Even if this court applied tne test set
out in Frye, tnat test could not be used to
determine tne admissibility ot hypnotically

attected testimony. Frye applied to the
admissibility ot "expert testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle."
(293 F. at 1014). Here, it is not expert
testimony that is challenged. Rather, it is
the admissibility of an eyewitness1 posthypnosis identification which is in question.
. . . But it is not the reliability of
hypnosis to put one in a hypnotic trance that
is at issue when the witness testifies. It
is the reliability ot a specific human memory
as affected by hypnosis that must be
examined. There are no experts who can
testify as to wnat specific etfects hypnosis
has had on the witness1 memory; just as there
are no experts who can testify tnat a normal
waking memory ot an event is in fact a
completely accurate representation of wnat
actually occurred. The most a trial judge
can do is review the hypnotic session to
ensure that no impermissible suggestiveness
has occurred. However, in such a review, it
is not the reliability ot hypnosis that is to
be examined. Rather, it is the etfect of a
specific hypnotic session that is to be
determined.
We conclude that the test set out in
Frye is inapplicable to this case. (329 N.W.
2d at 3SJ3> .
The strict per se inadmissibility rule which is
premised on Frye is unduly harsh and restricts valuable evidence
designed to disclose the truth.

Not only is a witness precluded

from testifying regarding the occurrence of a crime, but such a
position also discourages proper investigation ot the crime and
apprehension of the criminal.

As stated in State v. Beachum. 97

N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 24b (198^), such a position places the State in
the dilemma of choosing to use a particular witness at trial or to
use hypnosis on the witness as an investigatory tool.
bar presents a good example of this dilemma.

The case at

Under Frye* the party offering expert testimony has tne
burden of showing that that expert's opinion is reliable.

In the

case or hypnotically rerreshed testimony, there is no such burden
because the testimony offered is tnat of a lay witness testifying
as to facts as she recalls them.

Because hypnotically rerreshed

testimony does not fall within the ambit of the Frye Rule and,
moreover, because the application ot the Rule would hamper
legitimate law enforcement etforts and inhibit the ascertainment
ot truth, the Frye test should not be applied to determine tne
admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony nor the burden
ot proot.
Detenoant argues the Tyrell's testimony must be
excluded under Frye, as not a generally accepted scientitic
technique and also that the State failed to sustain its burden
under Fryq by not presenting expert testimony as to the
reliability ot post-hypnosis testimony.

Relying on Phillips v.

Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980), decided prior to the adoption
or the new rules ot evidence, he claims the evidence must be
excluded for lack of foundation because it is not "sutticiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the field" and is
not "sutticiently reliable."

!£. at 1233.

(Phillips is based, in

part, on the well-known Frye standard, 29J F. at 1U14.)

This

argument is inconsistent with the clear language of new Utah R.
Evid. Rule 702 (1987) , which says notning about general
acceptance.

Moreover, Rule 401 broadly defines relevant

evidence,0 and Rule 402 states that all relevant evidence is
admissible except as otherwise provided under the Constitution, a
federal statute, or anotner rule.
Scientitic evidence can be relevant and tnus admissible
under Rule 401 and 702, even if not generally accepted.

See, J.

W e m s t e m and M. Berger, 3 Wemstem's Evidence S 702103J (1985).
This explains why courts are now abandoning the Frye standard,
and recognizing that novel techniques or applications are a
factor for the trier of fact to consider and weigh, not a
tnresnold requirement for admissibility.

State v. William* 4

Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983); State v. Williams. 388
A.2d 5U0 (Me. 1978); United States v. Williams. 58J F.2d 1194 (2d
Cir. 1978); Gannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence;

Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later. 80 Colum.

L. Rev. 1197, 1208-23 (1980).

This is not to say tnat a trial

judge, taced with a chariatan could not exclude grossly
unreliable testimony on the ground it is neither relevant under
Rule 401, nor helpful to the trier ot fact unaer Rule 702.
Judge Daniels made an assessment in this case to admit
Tyreil's testimony as sufficiently and independently corroborated
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 97). This was not an abuse of discretion,
especially given that tne defense, at trial and betore tne jury,
failed to submit the videotaped session and called no experts of
its own to dispute the reliability ot hypnosis testimony.
6

Nor

Rule 401 defines relevant evidence as that "having any tenaency
to make the existence of any fact tnat is of consequence to the
determination ot the action more probable or less probable tnan
it would be without the evidence."

would a detenaant be precluded from objecting to the evidence
under Rule 403 on the ground tnat the probative value of the
evidence is suostantiaxly outweighed by tne danger ot unfair
prejudice, contusion, or misleading the trier of fact, or by
considerations on undue delay or waste ot time,
U££L£, 359 N.W.2d 604, 609 (Minn. 1984).

gee State v.

While defendant

objected to Tyrell's testimony as too suggested, he did not make
a Rule 403 objection either at the pretrial suppression hearing
or at trial.
C. THIS COURT COULD ALSO FIND THAT THE
TESTIMONY OF PATRICIA TYRELL WAS ADMISSIBLE
BY ADOPTING A MINORITY VIEW THAT HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED TESTIMONY IS ADMISSIBLE ONLY IF
ADEQUATE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN
COMPLIED WITH.
As noted above, the courts have taken three different
positions regarding the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed
testimony.

First, there is the majority view—wnicn tne State

urges this Court to adopt—that such testimony is admissible and
that the defendant may adequately protect himself by attacking tne
credibility of that testimony.

Second, there is the minority

view—wnicn tne State opposes and defendant advocates—that
hypnotically refreshed testimony is per SJSL inadmissible.

And

tnird, there is anotner minority view wnich holds tnat
hypnotically refreshed testimony is admissible, but only if
specific procedural safeguards have been met.

Should tftis Court

choose to adopt this third "procedural safeguards" view, the
testimony ot Patricia Tyrell is still admissible.
While the procedural safeguards required vary among
jurisdictions following tnis approach, these courts have held

that:

a detenaant must be advised tnat a prosecution witness has

been hypnotized and must be given all statements of the
proceedings relative thereto, Gee v. State, 662 P.2d 103, 104
(Wyo. 1983), there must be a valid investigatory purpose. State v.
Ii2aa# 32 Wash. App. 732, 649 P.2d 84b, 84/ (1*8^); a trained
psychiatrist or psychologist must conduct the hypnosis, and the
individual conauctmg the hypnosis should be indepenaent ot, and
not regularly employed by, the parties involved, State v. Wood, 86
N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (1981).
In tne present case, Tyrell sought out the hypnosis on
her own.

It was not compelled by police or the prosecutor.

The

hypnosis session was conducted by Dr. Hillroyd, a clinical
psychologist at U.C.L.A., (Tyrell 68-69; R. 282) on October 19,
1984 (Tyrell 100). Dr. Hillroyd's hypnotism ot Tyrell was
independent of State influence (Tyrell 68-69).

Both the

prehypnosis statements given to Chiet Bell and Dr. Hillroyd were
recorded and transcribed (R. 272-87; Memorandum in Opposition to
Detenaant*s Motion to Suppress Tyrell's Testimony—Exhibits A and
B; Pti. Tr. 58-60, 64, 65; Tr. Vol. 1 at 75; Tyrell 85-86), as was
the hypnosis session itself (Tyrell 100; Exhibits A and B, supra).
Moreover, defense counsel was provided the prehypnosis and
hypnosis statements ot Patty Tyrell, as was the district court (R.
10, 47, 316; Tr. Vol. 1 at 75). Only Tyrell and Dr. Hillroyd were
present during the session, and the session was not suggestive or

leading (Tr. Vol. 1 at 89-90).'

Accordingly, the admission ot

Patty Tyrell's hypnotically refreshed testimony was proper under
tne "procedural sateguards" view*
D. EVEN IF PATRICIA TYRELI^S HYPNOTICALLY
REFRESHED TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE, ANY
ERROR TO DEFENDANT WAS HARMLESS.
This Court has repeatedly held that criminal
convictions will be reversed only where error in the court below
was prejudicial to tne defendant.

See State v. Tucker» 709 P.2d

313 (Utah ly85) ("Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that '[a]ny error which does not attect tne suostantial
rights of a party shall be disregarded.•

We will not reverse a

conviction unless the error •is sometning suostantial and
prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood
tnat in its absence tnere would have been a different result.1"
(citations omitted)).

Thus, any error which would not likely have

atfected tne outcome ot tne defendant*s case will be disregarded
as harmless.
In tne present case, even if hypnotically retreshed
testimony were improperly admitted at trial, it is highly
improbable tnat Tyrell's hypnosis and tne testimony resulting
therefrom had any signiticant intluence upon the jury's verdict.

1

Defendant failed to make the videotape ot tne hypnosis session
a part of the record on appeal. £££. note 2, sueta. In such
cases, regularity ot the proceedings is presumed. State v.
Qlm<2&, 712 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986); State v. Sutton, 707 P.2d 681
(Utah l*8b). £f. Hanley v. State. 624 P.2d li«7, 13*1-92 (Nev.
1981); and People v. Home. 619 P.2d 53 (Colo. 1980) (where
sentence was challenged, failure to include presentence report in
record on appeal required dismissal).

Defendant and the State agree that information
established as having been recalled prior to hypnosis has been
held to be properly admissible at trial.
15, 20.

See Defendant's Brief at

In the last minutes of August 4, 1^84, the night Fred

Duncan was murdered, and the eariy hours ot August 5, 1984, Patty
Tyrell gave a brief description of the assailant to police
officers investigating the crime (R. 12/7-78).

She told Officer

Kip Ingersoll that the assailant was a tall male, wearing dark
clothes, possibly shorts, and carrying a small black hanagun (Ptl.
Tr. 36, 43). Later, at the Clinic in Park City, she told Chief
Bell she saw a male, approximately six feet tall, medium build,
wearing dark clothes, carrying a smooth flat pistol like an
automatic (Ptl. Tr. 5 9) .
Chief Bell interviewed Tyrell in his office on August
6, 1984, just two days after the shooting (R. 542-99).

When asked

to describe tne gunman, Tyrell said he was dressed all in black
and tnat he wore long pants.

She said she could not see his face

at all, but heard him say "You bastard" when he burst into tne
living room of the Oliver home.
sounaeo familiar to her.

The voice of the assailant

He carried a black gun, approximately

four to five inches long, with a clip.

(R.

582-87.)

She told

Chief Bell tnat she had met the defendant once over a year
previous in Miami (R. 589, 592), but that defendant knew Duncan
did not like him. She further stated that Duncan's dislike was
immense (R. 595-96).
On October 19, 1984, ot her own volition, Tyrell
underwent hypnosis to try to regain her memory of the details of

that night (R. 510; Tyrell 100)• During the prehypnosis interview
with Dr. Hillroydf she related that she knew the defendant was
dealing drugs and that she thought Duncan had interrupted
something "going down between Preston and Brian [Oliver] and
Preston was mad about it" (R. 28u). She indicated she saw hair on
the gunman's legs like he was wearing shorts and tnat it seemed he
was dressed in black.

He had goldish—medium blonae hairf and it

was unkeptf thick and curly.

She remembers the gunman saying "You

bastardf" Duncan saying "No#" and the gun going otf (R. 281). See
SLL&Q. the Statement of Facts to this brief.
Detenaant uses the majority ot his brier pointing out
inconsistencies in these prehypnosis statements (Defendant's Brief
at 3-7) • The majority ot these statements are consistent
throughout/ giving a general description of the events and the
assailant.

Moreover, these prehypnosis statements do not suffer

from any taint the defendant alleges hypnosis causes.

Therefore,

tney are all admissible and any inconsistencies in tnese
statements go to Tyrell's credibility/ a question for the ;jury.
At triali Tyrell only added that the assailant was
wearing a nylon stocKing over his face (Tyrell 23-24)•

However*

otner evidence properly admitted at trial independently supports
defendant's conviction and corroborates Tyrell's post-hypnotic
testimony tnat the detenoant was the assailant who intentionally
shot Duncan.

Defendant admitted to Kari Garnerf Ralph Garner and

Sean Sears that he shot Duncan.
he shot Duncan.

He turtner admitted at trial tnat

Several witnesses testified tnat the defendant

had long-running animosity toward Duncan, and that Duncan may have

interterrea with defendant's drug dealings (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93, 97;
Tyrell 35-36; 85; Tr. Vol. 2 at 266, 406-07, 415). 8

Accordingly,

any error in admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony was
harmless.9

£££ Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985) (although

hypnotically rerreshea testimony is inadmissible per se unaer
Florida rule, the admission of this testimony constituted harmless
error) and People v. Zayas,

111. App. 3d

,

N.E.2d

,

slip op. no. 84-1400 (June 26, 1987) (Addendum A) .
PQIBfT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY ADMITTING TESTIMONY DERIVED FROM
THE INTERCEPTION OF A TELEPHONE CALL FROM
THE DEFENDANT AND SEAN SEARS IN MIAMI,
FLORIDA, ON THE NIGHT OF THE MURDER.
Detenaant argues also tnat his conviction should be
reversed on the ground that the trial court admitted evidence
obtained in violation ot Utah Code Ann. § 77-23a-l et seq. (1982),
the Interception of Communications Act.
77-23a-2(4) in support ot his claim.
titled Legislative Findings.

He cites Utah Code Ann. §

However, § 77-23a-2 is

Its purpose is to outline the

rationale ot tne Act, not described unlawful activity.

Unlawful

activity is described in S 77-23a-4(l).

® For a complete discussion ot tne otner witnesses* testimony at
trial and how they corroborate Tyrell1 s in-court testimony/ JSJ££.
the Statement ot Facts to this Brief, supra at 2 and Point I.A.
JELUE2L& at £5.
' Defendant does not argue that the evidence against him was
insurticient. Nor has he shown tnat the evidence would have been
insufficient had Patty Tyrell"s testimony been excluded entirely.

Section 77-23a-4(2) describes lawful intercepts and
provides:
(a)(i) It shall be lawful unaer this
chapter for an operator of a switchboard,
or an otficer, employee, or agent ot any
communication common carrier, whose facilities
are used in the transmission ot a wire
communication, to intercept, disclose, or use
that communication in the normal course ot his
employment while engaged in any activity which
is a necessary incident to the renaition ot his
service or to the protection of the rights or
property ot the carrier ot the communication,
and the communication common carriers shall not
utilize service observing or random monitoring
except for mechanical or service quality
control checks.
At 2:00 a.nw on August 5, 1984, AT&T operator Jeanette
Gutfey handled a collect telephone call trom the Park City area to
Miami, Florida (Tr. Vol. 1 at 87-88, 91; Vol. 2 at 2!>4) . The
person initiating the call in Park City indicated tnat the call
was collect from Preston (Tr. Vol. 1 at 92), it was an emergency,
and requested her to hurry the call through (Tr. Vol. 1 at 89).
The call was placed to Sean Sears, a friend ot tne detenaant in
Miami (Tr. Vol. 1 at 91 Vol. 2 at 250). Sears accepted the cail
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 92; Vol. 2 at 250) , and Ms. Guffey pushed tne
appropriate release button to disconnect herself from the call
(Tr. Vol. 1 at 9J), but betore tne disconnect was complete,
Preston said there had been an accident, a man tried to rip him
otf, and he had killed him (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93) . The line then
disconnected, and Ms. Gutfey heard no further conversation between
Preston and Sears (Tr. Vol. 1 at 93). Shortly thereafter, Ms.
Gutfey intormed a police acquaintance of wnat she had heard.

She

eventually discussed tne contents ot that conversation with Chiet
Bell of the Park City Police Department (Tr. Vol. 1 at 94-95).
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Ms. Guffey1s acts, theretore, tall squarely within Utah
Code Ann. § 77-23a-2(a)(i) and are lawtul in all respects. Ms.
Guffey was acting in the normal course ot her employment when she
connected the collect call to Sean Sears for the defendant.
Furtner, she heard his confession that he had killed a man while
in the process ot connecting tnat call and dropping it to a
private line, an activity incident to rendition ot her services as
an operator.

The defendant simply started talking too soon.

He

began his conversation atter Ms. Guffey haa pusnea tne button to
drop the call otf her line, but before his call had actually
transferred.
Where the intercept is inadvertent and lawful, ratner
than wiiltul or deliberate, there is no rationale for suppression
or wnat was overheard.

Sections 77-23a-2(a)(i) and 77-23a-9(l)

through (3), Utah Code Ann. (1982) , specifically provide tnat the
information intercepted in such a manner may be disclosed while
giving testimony and in the course of a police investigation.
Because Ms. Guffey1s interception was lawful, her testimony may
not be excluded under Utah Code Ann. S 77-23a-7 (1982), which
provides for exclusion ot tne communication or evidence derived
therefrom only if disclosure would violate Chapter 23a.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, defendant's
conviction for first degree murder should be upheld.
DATED this l_l

day of August, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
ATTORNEY GENERAL

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDUM A

People v. Zayas,
111. App. 3d
N.E.2d
,
f
slip op. no. 84-1400 (June 26, 1987) (available on Westlaw,
West Publishing, ]987).
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istice LORENZ delivered the opinion of the court:
i appeal from his ju*y<*ir*al <;€kf**ActioB--ot* -tfcnr-ee -counts of«j**rder defendant
*nando Zayas seeks a new trial based on the following co^t^uiions: <1> the
ors were improperly questioned concerning their views on the death
laity; <2) the State improperly utilized its peremptory challenges to
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le "following pBrtinent -mmdrnnee wag-adduced at defendant's trial. At about
15 a.m. on July 2, 1983 Miguel Vargas, Luis Cuaresma, and Ruben Gutierrez
e shot to death on the front porch of a two-flat building at 1438 West
;alpa in Chicago. On the premises at the time of the shooting were Carlos
gas, Julia Tiro, and Ruby Mateo. Carlos Vargas testified at trial that he
I just emerged from the apartment onto the porch to join the victims when he
Lrd a gunshot. He saw the defendant, whom he had known for six or seven
ITS, shooting at the victims from the bottom of the steps. Carlos heard
eral more shots and then returned inside, where he asked Ruby and Julia to
1 the police. Carlos initially told the police that he had been in the
chen and had not seen the shooting. He also admitted that on his
;tructions Julia and Ruby told the police the same thing. Carios-teatifiad
tt.iia d^d-oafc «*itialiy tell .4hft .-irutk t>#£aus# he feared for his family'%s
©. He also testified that he and Miguel Vargas were members of the Insane
nowns street gang whereas defendant was a member of the Disciples,
ibsequently on July 13 Carlos told the police that he had seen the defendant
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o t m g at the victims.
other eyewitness testifying for the State was Timothy McGovern. On the
urrence date McGovern, then fourteen, lived across the street and two doors
the east of the two-flat building. As he was walking home, at a point three
>rs from his house, he saw two men leave a car and walk toward the two-flat.
n he was two doors from home he heard a gunshot and saw the defendant firinj
iun toward the porch of the two-flat. After four or five shots the defendan
t north through a gangway.
Govern also testified that out of fear he did not initially tell the police
>ut what he saw. On August 16, 1983, McGovern's brother Thomas was shot

aing into the McGovern home. When two police officers came to investigate
it shooting, which Timothy thought might be related to the July 2 shooting,
told them what he had seen on July 2. He subsequently identified the
Pendant from a book of 150 to 200 photographs and then in a lineup.
>corro Roldan testified that in 1979 he and the defendant were members of th
tin Disciples street gang. In 1978 one of the victims in the cause, Miguel
rgasf a member of another gang, killed a Latin Disciple named Ramon MChi Chi
>quez. Trial evidence established that Vargas pled guilty to the killing in
Juvenile Court proceeding. According to Roldan defendant had a tattoo on hi
n stating "Chi Chi, rest in peace."
\e evening after the shootings Roldan went to a party celebrating those
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llings. There the defendant told him that he, Jose Rodriguez, Ricky Garcia,
i an unnamed fourth person had picked up a car belonging to Jose's sister,
mita, without her knowing about it. They then drove to the two-flat, where
:
endant, Garcia and Rodriguez shot the victims, using two .38 caliber guns
i a .357. Afterward they ran though the gangway to the car, which they
turned to its spot at Juanita's house. A State firearms expert subsequently
>tified that the bullets recovered from the victims' bodies established that
>y were shot with .38 caliber and .357 magnum weapons,
i July 30, 1983 Roldan was hospitalized after being shot by another member o
> Latin Disciples. During the investigation of that shooting Roldan told th
Ace of defendant's admissions. Defendant subsequently visited Socorro at th<
>pital. Police officers were secreted so as to overhear the conversation.
*e record indicates that the conversation was taped but the tape was of poor
Llity and the jury was not informed of it.) When Socorro asked about the
pie murder defendant denied any involvement, but he did say that Jose
Iriguez had been shot by Garcia during the incident. Defendant also told
:orro to be quiet because somebody was "trickingM on him, an expression
:orro understood to mean informing on him. Socorro believed that defendant
lied any involvement because defendant believed Socorro was talking to the
ice.
t*krigfrr^>»ir~«kteiwer-^trfgcfetCTrr*Hfch^£tefre*-tt-i-so-feIicited testimony
COPR. (C) WEST 1987 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOVT. WORKS
> Copy
R 1 OF 1
P 5 OF 22
IL-CS
P

^a9o~-Pufcii^'^i»c^lFVg^^
,^htre^r€>cail* Had been- enhanced-Ahrougl
Moesi<6. Out*.of *~*he~?urY'« -presef*w*he~oourt f i r s t . h e a r d the. testimony pf •
>-hypnotists Dr. "Bennett 6. HBraunt BrauR%iasUf i e d :4hat .-he-.vas auchiat-ri-st-t-a d i r e c t o r .of the Aflrerican-Board of ^Hypnotists#_^nd a ^consultant
Jy-tihe £oek -County -Sherrf-f^s Department, ~1iol<Jif>g the t i t l e of deputy
>**f£. Braun t e s t i f i e d ^e*-ienfi*v«>4y*-com:eTTiifig £ * s q u a i l f i x a t i o n s and the
d e l i a e s h e followed
m~knrpnoti*i*g~totb *ns tn -an attempt to avo»i<i problems a:
lflest4on -and -confabulation *<f JJi4i»g-naU^**e*ocy -gaps * u t h . 4 $ a g i n e d r e c a l l >
ooia*W~*±th hypnosis. Ih* ^co^ir^mtnd:.Brawn to be-hi-gbly q u a l i f i e d , in .±be>
l{d a.nd : Alsq found the S t a t e , u a s . n o t - ^ q u i r e d - t o e s t a b l i s h that hypnosis **as
4#l-dL<>a&aoQ9in§ k feasonable d e g r e e of - s c i e n t i f i c c e r t a i n t y . D e t e c t i v e •
JLi«.4Jien.-Jttetifiedt b e f o r e the j u r y , .-.that a t .1:45 a#*a, o n the aorning of ihi
otirog ihc .-and -his partner-drove * to the shooting scene and ttwn continued
.tb.9JL»Q~bJiGcks. A^J^flUt^luLe par.-wi^h f our * a l e ocoupanis p u l l e d in f r o n t s
* r QA^^Qf^-rth^, gasfrgftgerg Jcept Jooicing backhand Atkins looked
briefly at.
.JUc«**se ^ l a t e . «J4fr-~€k4^wo* ^nrrte doim -ibe~ ra**ber becau*a ;c 4^ e y ^ac^ been to\<
±aok-~-4*>* <a car c o n t a i n i n g it*o female -LatinsL**Hoi+e*ef'*ktt^htB? -returned t #
—shooting s c e n e Atkins -was t o l d , t h a t - a l i g h t binie tt^o-door^car might tfe
t*lved. ThX&*&ou$dfc<i .ftjjQj.la.r.^to i h e car Atkins had paeii,f ^da&cnbed by:him ai
-4«re**s A A i g h t - b i u e -oar ,\probably a Plymouth Sebri&g* -^.tcense. jvumbej. XND
&fi*r &e4*g.„ hypnotized At k ins r e c a l l e d t h e . c a r as.rbei*>g.a l i g h t b l u e ,
Copy
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,e «po4el tuuo-door Ponixact w i t h chropi^Aiqund the jeax 4iUjxdQUt 4 red and taji
ck&r *>*-the 4ricensa> p l a t e f * n d ike licex)$e number NXJ 402..
i a l ^vrd«rnoe ssrtabiiBhed t h a t *the lac^nse p l a t e of .Juaruta Rodriguez's. <;are
ch 4 e £ e n d a M - a i l e a e d - l r ~s^±<i -t*as-«u&ed -i£_the s h o o t i n g , was NXJ 2 4 0 .
Spcorrq,
dan .had.^lsor-ta^fcififtd t h a t he knew Jua*i^a'.s.£a4\.io*be a*I*ght.t>lVe, two•r ^©hl^Jhe.

fendant presented an alibi defense. Angelo Ferrand, the step-father of
endant's girl friend Latena, testified that defendant and L a t e n a stayed a
rand's Waukegan home from June 30 until July S. On July 1 he saw the
endant at the Waukegan home in the evening before going to bed at midnight
I also sam him the next morning at 9:00 a.m.
>se Aviles, a cousin of Latena, testified that he drove defendant and
e n a up to the Waukegan house on June 30, and they stayed until about July
On July 1 he watched television with defendant until 1 or 2 a.m. and then
i him again at 7:00 a.m. the next day. Luis Allendi, Latena's brother, als<
'ed at the Waukegan house and testified that defendant and L a t e n a were then
oughout the holiday weekend, including July 1 and 2.
>e defense also called Juanita Rodriguez. She denied even lending her car t<
brother, Jose Rodriguez, in the month of July or any other time. The
m n g of July 1 she had the car keys home with her. She saw her car at 6:30
i. when her husband drove it home from work and again when she got up in the
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ning at 9:00 a.m.
4 IwM-rig^JTfry"r^fe^it!FeTattt>ns^t*e-f^fvrfaTTt-vas-convicted of three-cou?>t9 of -tntirdtfi
I v a s ^ f f t e h o e i t t o "thr^e- corrcurr^nt terias of imprisonment . f o r DaJturaL.l-if^
"tootif p a r ^ l § .
NION
1.
ior to trial the State announced its intention to seek the death penalty,
endant contends he was prejudiced when, despite his stated intention to
ve his right to a jury at the death penalty stage of the proceedings, the
al court permitted the State to question the jurors concerning their views
the death penalty pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510,
L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770. In Daley v. Hett (1986), 113 111.2d 75, 495
.2d 513, our supreme court determined that a defendant could exercise such «
trial waiver. However our supreme court has subsequently determined that
ey does not apply retroactively, nor would the death-qualifying of a jury
pite such a proper waiver prejudice a defendant. People v. Enckson
87), # 59058,--111.2d
, --N.E.2d
.
, 2.
fendant, a Hispanic, also contends that the State improperly exercised its
emptory challenges to exclude 14 of 15 blacks and the sole Hispanic from th«
y in violation of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), --U.S.
, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 10(
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t.v 1712. The State initially contends that the record does not establish
many blacks were on the jury, and it also*notes that a Hispanic alternate
or was selected. In any event we find that under the express holding of
son defendant lacks standing to challenge the exclusion of blacks from the
y. The Batson court held that to establish such a case "the defendant must
st show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, (citation
tted), and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove
m the venire members of the defendant's race/1 (--U.S.
,
, 106 S.Ct.
2, 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d 69, 87, (emphasis added).> Although the Colorado
reme Court recently ruled that a black defendant could challenge the
lusion of Hispanics from the jury, that court did so on the basis of a Sixtt
ndment and Colorado constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-

tion of the community. (Fields v (Colo. 1987), 732 P.2d 1145.) However the
ted States Supreme Court has declined to extend the fair cross-section
luirement to petit juries. (Loclchart v. McCree (1986), U.S. -9 -1 90 L.Ed.2d
, # 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1765.) Accordingly, we find that defendant lacks
nding to challenge the State's partial exclusion of blacks from this jury.
also find no merit to defendant's claim that the elimination of a single
panic from the jury necessitated a Batson hearing. The potential juror at
ue stated during voir dire that she had a nephew currently in jail, a
uation which she described as Mvery painful" to the family. She also statec
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nephew persisted in associating with the same "group." Although she statec
t she believed the courts were fair in his situation, we do not find that a
son challenge to the State's peremptory challenge could reasonably be
tamed. Accordingly, we find no basis for reversal on this ground.
3.
fendant also contends that in opening argument the State twice improperly
uded to incriminating evidence which was then not introduced at trial. In
instance the State informed the jury that defendant had vowed revenge
inst one of the victims, Miguel Vargas, because Vargas killed defendant's
end, Ramon MChi ChiM Vasquez. As we have noted, at trial the State did
ablish that defendant told Soccoro Roldan that Vargas had killed Chi Chi anc
t defendant had a tattoo stating "Chi Chi, rest in peace/' However the
rt then barred the State from eliciting from Roldan, himself a former membei
the Latin Disciples, that a gang membpr seeking revenge for a slaying would
e the slain member's name tattooed on himself. Clearly there was no
iberate misconduct by the State on this issue, nor did this openmg-argiunenl
tement substantially prejudice the defendant, given the eyewitness testimoni
ch directly implicated him in this crime. Accordingly we find no reversibh
or arising from this comment. People v. Platter (1980), 89 Ill.App.3d 803,
N.E.2d 181.
ere is no merit to the second opening-argument comment objected to by
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endant. The State told the jury that while in the hospital Socorro Roldan
told by defendant of the involvement of his two fellow gang members but
Id not admit his own involvement. As our earlier summary of Roldan's
timony establishes, this statement by the State was a substantially accurate
ount of Roldan's testimony on this point.
4.
fendant next contends that on several occasions the trial court improperly
red defense evidence. In the first such instance the defense was barred
m introducing evidence concerning the gun used in the shooting of Timothy
overn's brother Thomas, six weeks after the shootings at issue here. That
was subsequently destroyed, apparently mistakenly, by the police
artment. Defendant contends that he should have been permitted to present
se facts to the jury in order to establish a police conspiracy to destroy
sibly exculpatory evidence. We find that the court properly exercised its
cretion to bar the presentation of such speculative evidence. (People v.
on (1983), 117 Ill.App.3d 522, 453 N.E.2d 849.) The subsequent testimony by
tate firearms expert was that it was not very probable that any of the
lets recovered from the three victims came from the same type of weapon
olved in the McGovern shooting. Under these circumstances we find no abuse
discretion in the trial court's ruling,
e defendant also sought to call two witnesses who would have testified
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cerning possible motives by others to kill the victims. One of the

tnesses, Harry Ramirez, would have testified that one or two days before the
Doting one of the victims threatened Ramirez and a second person with a gun,
B second witness, Jimmy Torrez, would have testified that he witnessed the
lying of Ramon "Chi Chi" Vasquez by Miguel Vargas, one of the victims in thi
se. At that time Vargas also fired two shots at Torres. Neither of these
tnesses was connected in any manner with the shootings at issue and again we
nd that the court properly barred this speculative evidence,
i the final instance of precluded testimony the defense had unsuccessfully
ight to obtain a continuance in order to secure the appearance of Frank
rnef a subpoenaed witness who failed to appear on the required date. In the
*sence of counsel for defendant and the State the court telephoned the
tness, who suffered from multiple sclerosis. Byrne told the court that he
i fallen and did not know whether he could appear the next court day, which
xld come after a weekend recess. Byrne's doctor also told the court that it
s very doubtful Byrne could get to court under any circumstances.
ie defense had represented that Byrne would testify that he lived on Gregory
reet, north across the alley from the two-flat and that he heard shots
tween 1:30 and 1:45 early on the morning in question and saw two men run
rth across Gregory into a schoolyard and then further north. However the
tness told the court over the telephone that he only saw one man. In any
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?nt given the unlikely possibility that the witness would have been able to
stify and the failure of the defense to establish the vital nature of this
>timony we find no error in the denial of the continuance. People v. Rivera
578), 64 Ill.App.3d 49, 380 N.E.2d 1018.
5.
*fendant next contends that he should have been permitted to impeach State
tness Carlos Vargas with a prior disposition of supervision received by
rgas on a theft charge. Our supreme court has held that the successful
apletion of a period of supervision does not result in a conviction and thus
not a proper basis for impeachment. (People v. Schuning (1985), 106 111.2d
, 476 N.E.2d 423.) Absent a showing that Vargas' supervisionary period was
t successfully completed and resulted in an actual conviction, we find the
ial court's ruling to be proper.
» next consider dfc^rfdamt^'cfonYeTrt iotf t+mt -the t**al court erred when-it
ifrrtt^tf ttre hypndtfcally^cFnhranced testimony of Officer Atkins concerning the
isase-prtatte'^tiflrttef of the vehicle he saw 2 1/2 blocks from the shooting,
u s contention i*a***^ a ~i*gai issue whtch has not been determined by. the
ii4wx&.«^refte ceur*, whebtw* iyyspno^H-caiiy^enhanced testimony*should be
>M&©ifelo IT* f m * 6 i s courts. Jf^J^c^U .v*J4*4so» (1987) f 116 111.2d 2 9 /
[.2d t the cQurLiflgec^AGally^aseT*^
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4m~*4h&*&&~tf'nkyfm^

The

*t«*«as.&f ^the 'Hliftois appe 1 i ate -court- on this issue are conflicting. As
)63. in fi*ofr1yy% Harom^t^SSSt.
111 Wi^pp.eti 204, 250 N.E.2d 5,
jourth District) of this court indicated in dicta that hyfljioyiff_-vg.c Pgf
£***^ltoi^*i**Jplx>
tft fl1ln,tl **F use in a criminal prosecution. fiui.ifrP*
>**^*«*™^^
a^>y£7S>, 68 Ul,flpp.3d 379, 385 N.E.2d848 f
Lt s — .district i4»SM*d H*nat -fwia-ins -the Leading 141 lnoijt-casj* -suppor£ing
h*»e iojn <of m*ch *«v*d*n<re. THer^^n State tutaess *tas permitted
to testify
I«MP**J>8 a*identification of the defendant that she was able to -make only
:*r~+je1tmq*4*fp7ioti ted1. The reviewing court, uith one justice dissenting,
md this evidence to be properly-admitted because it-found certain guideline!
*raet<
the "hypnotist lias competent, suggest ion was not used in the*io«*s* -the •'Identification was corroborated by other evidence, and the
;n#$s &*d an ample opportunity to vieu the defendant at the time of thfe

sttrrenca; In. " s o . h e l d f n g t h e ^oourt -re 1 l e d , m t e r ^ 4 - » a , en Harding v - Stafrp
368), W W . 4pp. 230, 246 A.2d 302, since.-overruled by S t a t e v. C o l l i n s
383), 2S6 ttd..S7e, 464 A.2d 1028. The court a l s o .erroneously suggested >,that
*hat t i n e no J u r i s d i c t i o n b a f r e d hypnotically-enhanced testimony. (See Jone
S t a t e (Okla. Crim. 1975), 542 P.2d 1316; Greenfield v. Commonwealth
374), 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 4 1 4 . ) The court alsq.x>rjAy.br4elly. alluded- to
a-probtems a s s o c i a t e d w i t h .hypnosis-, including Vf-antasyVlconfabulatl©*) and
> Copy
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*S***tbl*rtr;
68 I l l . A p p . 3 d 379, 388, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853.
i B«i|rfa:^L.-.jG.ib9on ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 117 Jlk.-App,3d 270, 452 N.E.2d 1368, the Sputth..
Kt»*«l -0taf firmed . i t s .holding in :S»relra», uhjJe. acknowledging t h a t . a number
. j u r i s d i c t i o n s had, si-nce the d e c i s i o n - i n Smrekar, barred hypnoticall*y»««e*d-©»yidence\ Jhe S»reJ»ar - g u i d e l i n e s approach was adopted by the Thud
/*^ion -of -ftbe -First D i s t r i f t t . (Peopie -v* Jordap ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 120 I l l . A p p . 3 d 836,
J N.E.2d 1115.) In Veapi*-*.; .8yas ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 117 I l l . A p p . 3 d 979, 453 N.E.2d
!l1, the H j i r d . I h s t r i c t .indicated .in . d i c t a that it. too would f o l l o w Smrekar.
i Fi/-th d i s t r i c t g e n e r a l l y adopted the Smrekar -approach, i e People v . Cohoon
383), 120 I l l . A p p . 3 d 62, 457 N.E.2d 998. But.**thout d i r e c t l y ^deciding tfce
**e--©-f the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of hypnotically-enhanced evidence o u x s u p r e m e c ©41/1
mr&eii the Cohoon - d e c i s i d n . (People v. Cohoon ( 1 9 8 4 ) , 104 irT72d'295, "472
:.2d 4 0 3 . ) That reversal was based cm-the c o u r t ' s determination t h a t in^any
wit -the . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a t i s s u e , made immediately a f t e r h y p n o s i s , « a s
>er»ts«ibly s u g g e s t i v e .
The court noted .the ri.sk of confabulation as well a
iai testimony i n d i c a t i n g that<-* hypn&ttit
carmot d i s t i n g u i s h - t r u t h from
vfabalation *ln* a s u b j e o t . Citing* i n t e r a l i a , - t h i s same Tisk af
^tabulation the c o u f t ^ a l s o determined that the .^subsequent i n - c o u / t
i n t i f teat ion was not independently based.
Fter the supreme c o u r t ' s Cohoon d e c i s i o n the f i f t h { D i s t r i c t , i n People A/.
* * t * ( 1 9 8 5 ) , 133 I l l . A p p . 3 d 639, 479 N.E.2d 355, h e l d - t h a t t h e - t r i a l "court
> Copy
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*p€Frly"*e*cltided testimony -by.a c l i n i c a l p s y c h o l o g i s t that while under < 3i^ in ^T
>TK»is the de~f endant ?>onverbal ly denied committing the of f e n s e s vu
YJ^SLM.
•sfi'oh. The a p p e - H a t y c u a i t '"tfrs t fttguTshed those I l l i n o i s c a s e s which have &
nit ted hypnotically-enhanced
testimony, no4<4nq tha4 l «*he'«egmoe-before -ft^**4v«d*««^^e«c«a^ttctt !t«fdvfrorm-"=a
mfttte^s -while %t i-H Hinder-hyfm©s»is*. But the
ir t ai sir *g^ngratty" ^o"unoK "hVpncs^'S—t-o -»«rtif feT---*T<o«m--*he- *ame• ^def i-e*enc *es-^s
hr3T*ph~**r«lF»s -and^TtrttHsertfniFlndttced ev-idenee. Motine that- ifl S*hean the
l i n o i s supreme court had expressed, doubts oonoersung t h e . s c i e n t i f i c
sa^tatrii. i ty *>f h y p n o s i s the* duck e f t cdurt h e l d that the evidence in question,
»jg_r©pe«- ly . re j e c t e d .
*e' d u w t n t - s t a t e -of t h e l a w - o n t h t s point i n - o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s i s a l s o J^n
rflict,
although- a c l e a r "trend, has d e v e l o p e d . A 4 e v - / 4 i r i s d i c t i o p s have
termined that hypnotically-enhanced testimony i s general l y admissible-, .**4tk>
K»»e*ght'*'f-such evidence l e f t to the f a c t - f indens. ( S t a t e v. Wren (La.
».,,
13)., 425 So.2d 756; S t a t e v. Commeau (Me. 1981), 438 A.2d 454; S t a t e v. o&»
>wn (N.D. 1983), 337 N.W.2d 138; S t a t e v. Glebock (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)
I S.W.2d 897; Chapman v. S t a t e (Wyo. 1982), 638 P.2d 1280; Clay v. Vose
it C i r . 1984), 771 F.2d 1; U.S. v. Awkard (9th Cir. 1979), 597 F.2d 6 6 7 . ) ^
>e.^»ri'«(iw>tAono-f»«Ti»44-.«»*K?hr«uXde.w;e .pnly A»hexa g u i d e l i n e * .concerning 3J* 3M[
l i a b i l i t y Are mef. ( S t a t e v . Iwakiri C1984). 106 Idaho"618, 682 P.2d 571 {Of 1!
Lse v. S t a t e (Miss. 1984), 445 So.2d 815; S t a t e v. Hurd ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 86 N.J. 525
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> A.2d 86; S t a t e v. Beachum (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d
\\ Or. Rev. S t a t . ( 1 9 8 5 ) , s 136.675; Vester v. S t a t e (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)
I S.W.2d 715, a f f ' d on other grounds (Tex. Crim. 1986), 713 S.W.2d 920;

kins v. Commonwealth (1985), 230 Va. 280, 337 S.E.2d 264; State v.
strong (1983), 110 Wis.2d 55, 329 N.W.2d 386; U.S. v. Valdez (5th Cir.
4 ) , 722 F,2d 1196; U.S. v. Kimberlin (7th Cir. 1986), 805 F.2d 210, cert,
ding 86-6445; Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp. (8th Cir. 1985), 771
d 1112.) lk4.^>a~«M9.F«toltfci«g -majoarrty -©f^ •}artsd4ctions %riuch have
s MJ**e4 4hri-» issue -bar ••fTOw the ~cx>u?-tT«oji* amy hypnot ica 1 ly^enhancori
VO^
-Mworry*,' Contreras v. State (Alaska 1986), 718 P.2d 129; State v. Mena
^
81), 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274; R»dc~v^-S4a4^-U98&i».^gS-4Uk^566t..7.a8
w2d<*JQ,t***'*<l- i^safar-^e^-Kafr-kai* e*tended to a. ^efeRdant'*. (4-esti«»ony JLJjjLje
R4-S87->^ttotrr-eGr.l30,--ii.-S-». -2 1.rEd.2d, S.Ctv<»rai4*b-le * n w ^ | *387y *>t\
iS^v£«wfed.ai-braryr-OS #44e^; People v. Shirley (1982) ,*"3V Cai: 3d 18, 641
6 775 (except for a defendant's own testimony); People v. Quintanar (Colo.
. 1982), 659 P.2d 710; State v. Atwood (1984), 39 Conn. Supp. 273, 479 A.2c
; State v. Davis (Del. Super. 1985), 490 A.2d 601; Bundy v. State (Fla.
5 ) , 471 So.2d 9; Walraven v. State (1985), 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798;
te v. Moreno (Hawaii 1985), 709 P.2d 103; Strong v. State (Ind. 1982), 435
.2d 969; State v. Seager (Iowa 1983), 341 N.W.2d 420; State v. Haislip
85), 237 Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 775; State v. Collins (1983), 296 Md. 670, 464
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d 1028; Commonwealth v. Kater (1983), 388 Mass. 519, 447 N.E.2d 1190;
pie v. Gonzales (1982), 415 Mich. 615, 329 N.W.2d 743, modified on other
unds (1983), 417 Mich. 1129, 336 N.W.2d 751; State v. Mack (Minn. 1980),
N.W.2d 764; Alsbach v. Bader (Mo. 1985), 700 S.W.2d 823; State v. Palmer
81), 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648; People v. Hughes (1983), 59 N.Y.2d 523,
N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255; State v. Peoples (1984). 311 N.C. 515, 319
.2d 177; State v. Weston (1984), 16 Ohio App.3d 279, 475 N.E.2d 805; Jones
State (Ok la. Crim. App. 1975), 542 P.2d 1316; Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch
81), 496 Pa. 97, 436 A.2d 170; State v. Martin (1984), 101 Wash. 2d 713,
P.2d 651.
Kr^caftUB^Jsedy-cf mrthwrty V€r|eicttng*'the "courtrcwn use of..hypnotical lyanced Jes-tiJtony is -*iso~ reflected =ii» the 4egal and scientific literature.
' 'Bernard l_. Diamond, a clinical professor of psychiatry, has exhaustively
mined the problem associated with hypnosis of prospective witnesses.
vrif*- «fch* lU^-af Pretrial Hypnosis ^>TV a~ Prospective
&*&^< 68 Calif. L. Rev. 313 (1980).) Among the problems he identiTies are
following. Hypnotized subjects commonly seek to please their questioners,
the extent that they will commonly confabulate, filling in missing details
h fantasy. Even experienced hypnosis experts cannot determine whether
notically-enhanced recall is reliable and valid. Diamond notes that even
cificity and richness of detail does not mean the memory is accurate; such
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arent recall can be the product of confabulation. Thus Diamond cites one
dy in which hypnotized subjects were asked to project themselves ten years
0 the future. These subjects then purported to describe their future
roundings in great detail. Diamond also notes that because of the
ghtened suggestibility of hypnotic subjects the implanting of suggestion
not be avoided. The very context and purpose of the hypnosis can be
gestive, and a hypnotist with knowledge of the facts of a case may
onsciously cue the subject concerning these facts. According to Diamond
n videotaping an entire hypnosis session may not reveal all possible
gestiveness because events preceding and following the hypnosis become
egrated with the hypnotic experience, distorting the validity of the
ject's recall. Diamond summarized his views as follows.
1 believe that once a potential witness has been hypnotized for the purpose
enhancing memory his recollections have been so contaminated that he is
dered effectively incompetent to testify. Hypnotized persons, being
remely suggestible, graft onto their memories fantasies or suggestions

l i b e r a t e l y or u n w i t t i n g l y communicated by the hypnotist* After hypnosis the
>ject cannot d i f f e r e n t i a t e between a true r e c o l l e c t i o n and a fantasy or a
jgested d e t a i l . Neither can any expert or the t r i e r of f a c t . This risk i s
g r e a t , in my view, that the use of hypnosis by p o l i c e on a p o t e n t i a l witnes
tantamount to the d e s t r u c t i o n or f a b r i c a t i o n of e v i d e n c e . * « *<Even under
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ringent s a f e g u a r d s , including p r e s e n t a t i o n to the t r i e r of f a c t of the
l l e s t p o s s i b l e information on the e f f e c t s of hypnosis, the t r i e r w i l l not be
le t o s o r t out r e a l i t y from w i t n e s s fantasy and weigh t h i s testimony
>perly." 68 C a l i f . L . Rev. 3 1 3 , 3 1 4 - 1 5 .
more recent survey of the s c i e n t i f i c community's view of t h i s i s s u e a l s o
»arly supports e x c l u s i o n of such e v i d e n c e . (Ni»t*i J i i a l -by -Jranga^JLte
t—UAflfcJu3 The author n o t e s that a f t e r what he d e s c r i b e s as an e x h a u s t i v e
/iew of the s c i e n t i f i c research on hypnosis and memory the Council on
t e n t i f i c A f f a i r s of the American Medical A s s o c i a t i o n concluded that hypnosis
>uld not be used to prepare w i t n e s s e s for t r i a l . He a l s o c i t e s research
>wing t h a t : hypnotized s u b j e c t s respond i n c o r r e c t l y to leading q u e s t i o n s
Lee as o f t e n as non-hypnotized s u b j e c t s ; f a l s e memories from hypnotic recal
f a c t u a l l y r e p l a c e the o r i g i n a l memory; hypnosis does not improve f a c i a l
s n t i f i c a t i o n and may f a c i l i t a t e f a l s e p o s i t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s ;
hypnosis
as not improve the accuracy of r e c a l l but does s i g n i f i c a n t l y increase the
e j e c t ' s confidence in the r e c o l l e c t i o n .
^ * f e 4 ^ ^ # a 4 i 4 * g ie*ptMr±*~dai -±it*s^f-*eid~4^^0f V^Har t t n -firac ,-.+b3.Tt*ooiwBe«^ejd
vdeIknpo jfotTitm^axtoTGgvn*:of
4rypniptrcaliy^^nihaTTced^iestimony. were adopted.Jb» 4te*'-^*w~j*j#*4M€>
COUF4 ^ p People y . 4iurd # <1982) , 86 N.J. 525,' 432 A.2d
. B ^ V ^ w h s ^ o ^ t t t i y - / * ^ £3hri»^haw-ctet«r»ined Jthat hypnatically^^bance*!
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*tij*Gf!t-*£'~Twrt-teitf^l«r^n^jrfK>uld
^o-t -be f>ermitted a^wtri*!. Arae T o i ^ U f
^^^tttmii^JEmhtc^d^fastiiiOTiy^i i n £ye*U*R**s-.IesU«K>nyu:,,r Psychological*.
»p#c4*-resHi44^44« <M^-U^ T re<J*4e.r4984) f . p* -171 f 2iU - c i t e d in People ~v«
• k u r ^ t d f t * * ^ ? . • Carter** -3B& ,—*?&& *€A\*>*P*t\ 4 6 2 , r*$fi Pv2d €35*--6GG-ei.
ased on a l l t h e s e a u t h o r i t i e s ne^OfwJl.u(Je ifclwfct* J U U F U W S * AiM$-the~xd&$>T
iirrsti^^f^frtfcer/^XTimdlctions -in _tJ^«*coAmiry,-sbpuld not ^generally perttit
e~c«w±TW^'tis* of hyprtotix»Hv-ef4iaHced evidence because of t h e fundamental
pbX**,^<<«iiafcl4ityIffteffcnt 'in s u e h . testimony*. Because .ear-stiprefie court
r\*i-«»dy' thrtermiTOcf Hvat witnesses-may t e s t i f y concerning t h e i r f>reH^ypnoti
o o l i ^ c t i o n s Y «* would tiote 'that* t h i s comprehensive approach w i l l provide
ztecttamr+Ttm
mfcerently u n r e l i a b l e - t e s t i m o n y t r h i l e ? t 1 l i p e r m i t t i n g the use
iiyptmslB <&s ^n I n v e s t i n a t i v e t o o 1 . (See Harnish, Hypnotically Refreshed
stimony: In Support of the Emerging Majority and People v . Hughes 453 N.E.2
4 <N.Y.1983) f 33 Buff.L.R. 417 ( 1 9 8 4 ) . ) Q&.*Mi-i*t8'4**9**Qt
**t**d to : *h*
w^mo^.^^^-^^n^T^i.
The United S t a t e s Supreme Court has r e c e n t l y ruled
at d e s p i t e the r e l i a b i l i t y problems inherent in hypnotically-enhanced
stijoony, a d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t to t e s t i f y bars s t a t e s from
opting a per s e r u l e excluding a l l such testimony by a defendant. (Beafc^.
*aiij4**« Jmm 2&r*98??mt?EXIS
-Getffftd T f t f a t y , VS f l l ^ T ) This cause does
t i n v o l v e such testimony by a defendant and we leave for another day the
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e s t i o n of how I l l i n o i s w i l l accommodate a d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to t e s t i f y in
ch circumstances.
, '
Hifrwmsft i f hJHifr rf»r»n*'i W»PI i rti*» Lkim l i f f n i \ ^^lly-ffph^n^e^ jtestimony j>f
fc*fi<HP JUk*m+~ »h»»i<±^»i i w J » a a <*0£4M.4£adft ^a^ a u f t ' t l i i i l l ;4#iermin^ijhethei
J*&L*utu**+ > f w ) i ^ r c E g - b j T ' f W r e W l t t e E c g ^ ^ ^ d f t y ^ j ^ ^
no*-free* -held

k»^er-^:*#*ers4i>l«- (K**g * v £ U t e *Lnd« 1 9 8 4 X ^ 6 0 N,E*2d~-347;r Stat*_v,.
ocorrtai* <T98Q); *25ftrlti'547; *£H J>.:2d 5514) / Jhe testimony at issue 4id
^r^We^ny-i^ent
if ication 4of "the ftefendan-t artd.tierely .corroborated otber
plfihr ^rvi^efrc* presented by -**fve State concerning ^he <^ar *hix:h -defendant
*Q€tdiy*&&*&~£h -th*<rtiter The State presented eyewitness testimony by two
nesses identifying defendant as one of those who shot at the victims. One
those two witnesses had known the defendant for years. The State also
sented testimony by a third witness that defendant admitted his
ticipation in the shootings. %Giv*P«jtJw -fiatm* t>f^tMs '¥vft!e~ticS£Ve"a.re t»t
p*«te#~that -**ef •trdattt -was pfejuJiced by the hypnotical Ly-^enhanced evidence
oh-mmsmiv^jMtlated
*fco a-inscription of the-car se£n blocks away-frx>m the
pt-^ctne.ftcc<?r4>^al-y.H^.wjt.llv5ot;reverser$n tkisjflrouxttJ.
though defendant contends that certain photographs of the victims were
ecessarily gruesome and should not have been shown to the jury, defendant
failed to include those photographs on appeal and we will not consider the
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ue further. We would only note that ordinarily such matters are within the
siderable discretion of the trial court. People v. Hayes (1979), 70
.APp.3d 811, 388 N.E.2d 818.
8.
e final contention we consider is that the court should have given the jury
endant's non-IPI instruction concerning guidelines for evaluating eyewitness
ntification testimony. The Committee on Jury Instructions recommends that
separate instruction be given on identification evidence and that the mattei
left to final argument. (Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Criminal, No.
5 <2d ed. 1981).) We find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal of
s instruction. People v. Hefner (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 693 f 368 N.E.2d 1059
r the reasons set forth in this opinion we affirm the defendant's

ILLIVAN, P.J. and MURRAY, J., concur.
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